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Ethnicism and a warlord’s search for legitimisation 
The issue of legitimacy is central to the understanding of warlordism. We can define a 
warlord as a military leader who has political power, but little or no political legitimacy, both 
internally and externally. Military leaders, of course, do not completely lack legitimacy, 
otherwise they would not be leaders. However, their legitimacy is of a military type: they are 
recognised as effective military commanders by their troops and most importantly by their 
officers or subordinate commanders. However history shows eloquently that holding political 
power without political legitimacy is a difficult task. The warlord, therefore, depending on his 
intelligence and skills, will have to develop a form of political legitimacy or perish.  
 
Abdul Rashid Dostum, the leader of Junbesh-i Milli, one of the key factions in the Afghan 
civil wars of 1994-2001, could be described as a warlord in mid-1992. Through its militias 
and its administrators Junbesh still controlled at least ten percent of Afghanistan in 2004, 
including the whole province of Jowzjan, most of Faryab, Sar-i Pul and Samangan and parts 
of Balkh, Kunduz and Takhar. His source of power was largely military, although as it will 
be shown below, Junbesh was not just a loose coalition of military commanders, but also 
included political parties and groups. This paper means to show that throughout its history the 
issue of ethnicity has gradually risen as a key way to obtain political legitimisation among the 
population of northern Afghanistan, despite not having been on the original agenda. The aim 
is to show that warlord polities are not static entities, but can be capable of transforming and 
adapting under pressure and can raise the banner of ethnic or political causes.  
 
 
Seeking legitimisation with the centre: from the Movement of the North to Junbesh 
The Movement of the North effectively started as a reaction against re-centralisation, after the 
military and to a lesser extent political leaders of the region had won a considerable degree of 
informal autonomy due to their role in fighting the insurgency against the communist regime. 
Efforts at pooling together different forces in northern Afghanistan, in order to contrast what 
was perceived as an attempt by Pashtuns to re-establish their hegemony over the region, 
started as early as 1990, when Dostum began experiencing an increasingly difficult 
relationship with Pashtuns both in the army and in the Hizb-i Demokratik-i Khalq. He is 
reported to have stated, in July 1990 in Moscow, that Uzbeks and Turkmens in northern 
Afghanistan would not tolerate Pashtun command everything as in the past.1 His later refusal 
to accept the Pashtun general sent by President Najibullah in January 1992 to rein in the 
military commanders of Northern Afghanistan is a well-known story. It led to the alliance of 
a number of formerly pro-government military leaders, of whom Dostum was just the most 
prominent, with the various jihadi factions. This alliance took the name of Harakat-e Shamal 
(the Movement of the North). 
                                                
1 Kh. Khashimbekov, Uzbeki severnogo Afganistana, Moscow: RAN (Institut Vostokovedeniya), 1994, p.38. 
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After the jihadi factions, and in particular Jamiat-i Islami, seized control of Kabul, the 
leadership of the Movement of the North started feeling that it was being explicitely 
discriminated in the early months of the post-Najibullah era. They were told in Kabul that the 
Movement was not a political party, and therefore was not entitled to join the political 
discussions in Kabul.2 There were at least two real reasons for the cold reception in Kabul of 
the delegations sent by the Movement of the North. First of all, Kabul saw it as a temporary 
alliance which had no claim to a share of power as such. Second, the dominant force within it 
was the former military commanders of the communist regime, which made it unpalatable to 
the jihadi leaders. In other parts of the country many former officers of the communist regime 
were being incorporated in the militias of Jamiat-i Islami and other jihadi parties too, but in a 
subordinate role and after having been purged. 
 
As a result of its lack of success in gaining acceptance as a permanent player in Kabul, the 
leadership of the Movement of the North, in particular the military leaders with the support of 
some but not all political factions, decided to set up something resembling a party. Junbesh-i 
Milli-ye Islami was established in the early months of 1992. The leadership was probably 
aware that creating a party would not have provided the legitimisation that the leadership 
sought in Kabul, but the new party was expected to enhance the collective bargaining power 
of the Movement, as well as serve the purpose of consolidating the coming together of all the 
political forces of the north.3 On 1 June 1992, the first congress formally established the 
party. Dostum was elected as the leader, but among the deputies we find Ustad Atta, the 
commander of Jamiat-i Islami in northern Afghanistan and future enemy in many battles. At 
its core were the regular forces and the militias of Najibullah’s regime, which were 
particularly strong in the North,4 but the 31-strong membership of the Executive Council of 
the new formation included representatives of all the parties of Northern Afghanistan. Among 
them, ten were former members of the Hizb-e Demokratik-e Khalq Afghanestan 
(HDKA)/Watan and other allied leftist parties, two were members of the Ismaili minority 
who had supported Najibullah and five were officers of the armed forces, mainly militia 
commanders; but 14 were commanders and representatives of the mujahidin parties, such as 
Jamiat-i Islami, Hizb-i Islami, Ittehadiya Shamal, Hizb-i Wahdat, Harakat-e Enqelab and 
Harakat-Islami. Moreover, at least two of the militia commanders selected for membership 
were known for having maintained links to the jihad parties before the fall of President 
Najibullah.5 On the whole, one could say that representation in the council had been roughly 
divided on a 50-50 basis between former supporters of Najibullah and the former opposition. 
The difference, however, was that the leftist parties had a structure and a membership, while 
the jihadi component was mainly represented by guerrilla commanders, who had little or no 
organised structure behind them. Only Hizb-i Islami and Jamiat-i Islami could even pretend 
to have anything resembling an organisation, and even that was rudimentary at best. 
 
In these early stages of the life of Junbesh, there were a number of obvious obstacles to the 
development of a solid party or organisational structure. The desire to develop such a 
structure was only half-hearted as far as the military leaders of the movement were 
                                                
2 A. Walwalji, Dar shamal chi guzasht, Peshawar, n.d., Book 2, Part 1, p. 66. 
3 The constitution of Junbesh states that “the Supreme Council of the Movement …is composed of 
representatives, with equal rights, of all the Jihadi organisations…” See S. Fida Yunas, Afghanistan: political 
parties, groups, movements and mujahidin alliances and governments (1978-1997), Peshawar, n.d., p.857. 
4 For more details about the origins and development of these militias, see A. Giustozzi, War, politics and 
society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992, Georgetown University Press, 2000, pp.198-231. 
5 Walwalji (n.d.), Book 2, part 2, pp.4-6. 
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concerned. They wanted a tool which would legitimise them in the eyes of the international 
community and allow them access to political bargaining in Kabul. On the other hand, the 
single, rather teneous unifying factor, that is northern interests, was hardly enough to offset 
tensions arising from the widely spread ideological spectrum which was present within 
Junbesh. Because of the prevalence of military leaders within it, ideological contrasts 
between leftist, Islamist and nationalist elements did not obviously surface during 1992-93, 
but they clearly stood in the way of any consolidation of an ideological and political identity 
of Junbesh, a fact that limited the credibility of Junbesh vis-à-vis Kabul. It appeared obvious 
that Junbesh would not last, at least not in its original form, and little urgency was felt in 
Kabul to accommodate the claim of its leadership to a fair share of power. In fact, such claim 
was seen with hostility by some key players in Kabul, including defence Minister Ahmad 
Shah Massud, who saw in it a threat to his attempt to establish hegemony over as large a part 
of Afghanistan as possible.6  
 
As a result of these conflicting aims and of its heterogeneous composition, during the first 
year or two of its existence, Junbesh was shaken by the attempt of its military component, or 
part of it, to establish its full control over it in the first place and then to legitimise its rule 
within the movement. This is why in the early years of Junbesh the main divisive factor 
within it was not ideology, but rather the race for supremacy among the leading personalities. 
Rashid Dostum, who was later to emerge as the undisputed leader of Junbesh, was not such 
an obvious choice in the early days. Although he had established himself as the leading 
military leader in the north once he had been assigned the command of the newly formed 53rd 
Division in 1988, other military, militia and jihadi figures had the ambition to lead the 
Movement of the North. This also explains why the leadership of Junbesh had little time to 
think of legitimising Junbesh itself among the population. 
 
 
Seeking legitimisation within Junbesh: Dostum’s initial struggle against rival leaders 
Among the jihadi commanders, the most stubborn challenge to Dostum’s leadership came 
throughout the 1992-2004 period from Ustad Atta, regional leader of Jamiat-i Islami. After 
his party colleagues had taken Kabul, Atta probably stayed in the Harakat-e Shamal only to 
facilitate his fight for hegemony in the north. During 1993, the early manifestations of the 
conflict between the two leaders led to the northern branch of Jamiat effectively quitting 
Junbesh, even if quite a few Jamiati field commanders stayed behind and sided with Dostum. 
Jamiat had the support of half a dozen members of the Executive Council of Junbesh, and 
Atta himself had been appointed deputy, but Jamiat’s leadership perceived itself as the 
essence of the jihad against the Soviets and many of its members hardly tolerated the idea of 
leaving northern Afghanistan largely under the control of their former enemies of the HDKA, 
who abounded in Junbesh.7 In this case ideology did play a role, together with the clash of 
personalities. One should add that Jamiat-i Islami was militarily in control of Kabul, and 
spent much of 1992 manoeuvring to establish a central government which it could dominate. 
Jamiat, therefore, could not have much interest in supporting an organisation like Junbesh, 
who aimed to collectively bargain for more power in running the affairs of northern 
Afghanistan vis-à-vis the central government. Even the northern branch of Jamiat was more 
likely to be tempted by exploiting privileged access to Kabul through its own party networks 
than relying on Junbesh as a northern lobby group. In any case, as Atta quit Junbesh, the 
                                                
6 This is the image which emerges from Walwalji (n.d.). 
7 Walwalji (n.d.), Book 1,  p.61. See also A. Giustozzi, ‘The demodernisation of an Army’, Small Wars and 
Insurgencies, 15:1 (Spring 2004), p.15. 
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challenge to Junbesh’s leadership from this quarter was over, although only to be replaced by 
a challenge to the existence of Junbesh itself. It is quite significant that the Jamiatis who 
stayed behind in Junbesh were all military commanders. Dostum had a strong appeal among 
military commanders, who appreciated his reputation as a fearless (and ruthless) military 
leader more then the politicians. Moreover, controlling the huge military stocks and supplies 
of Hairatan, he was in a position to reward his followers with plentiful patronage. 
 
The other challenge that Dostum had to face in the early months of Junbesh came from Azad 
Beg, the leader of the Ittehadiya Islami-ye Wilayat-e Shamal-e Afghanestan.8 Azad Beg 
clearly had the ambition of emerging as the political leader of the Turkic populations of 
Northern Afghanistan, and from the start he made some attempts to confine Dostum to a 
more military role. His movement had been awarded a strong representation within the 
Executive Council of Junbesh, where it had half a dozen members and sympathisers; but of 
course in terms of military strength, Azad Beg was no match for Dostum. Azad Beg’s 
strongest claim to legitimacy were his foreign contacts, especially in Pakistan and Turkey, 
but also Uzbekistan. In fact, his most noticeable activities were the lobbying of potential 
foreign supporters of Junbesh, mainly Turkey and to a far lesser extent Uzbekistan. When in 
1992 Turkey allegedly supplied Junbesh with US$10 million, US$6 were reported to have 
gone to Dostum and US$4 million to Azad Beg.9 Such foreign contacts, however useful, were 
not enough (quantitatively and qualitatively) to match Dostum’s much bigger firepower. Few 
of the other political groups within Junbesh had much sympathy for Azad Beg, nor were they 
ready to endorse him as the leader of the movement. Azad Beg was not helped by his weak 
organisational structure either. That, together with Dostum’s resources and military charisma, 
resulted in Dostum attracting the loyalty of most of Azad Beg’s commanders. The few who 
resisted Dostum’s call were eliminated.10  By the time he and Azad Beg finally broke their 
relationship in 1994, Azad Beg’s claim to the political leadership of Junbesh had already 
been defeated.  
 
From the point of view of Junbesh developing into a reasonably homogeneous and functional 
political organisation, the breakaway of Jamiat was probably beneficial, as it never had any 
intention of becoming fully integrated into Junbesh. Azad Beg’s group was too small to affect 
Junbesh on a large scale. However, for a movement whose main claim to political legitimacy 
was based on its representation of northern interests, these two splits were quite damaging. In 
any case, the start of the civil war in January 1994 threw Junbesh into a completely different 
situation. Even if the purpose of the conflict had initially been to force Kabul to 
accommodate Junbesh’s demands, a wholly new dynamic was set in motion.  
 
 
A special place for the Uzbeks: the ethnicity issue in the early years of Junbesh 
Junbesh has usually been described in Afghanistan and abroad as a Turkic or Uzbek 
party/faction and it has even been assumed that it claimed to represent the Turkic populations 
of Afghanistan. In this regard some qualifications are needed. As we have seen, Junbesh in its 
origins actually claimed to be the party of northern Afghanistan, rather than of just the 
                                                
8 Ittehadiya had been formed in Pakistan, apparently under the auspices of the Pakistani intelligence (ISI). 
Originally led by Abdul Karim Makhdoom, it then split and the leadership of the main body was taken over by 
Azad Beg. It played a minor role in the jihad and its ultimate aim was to bring the war to Soviet Central Asia. 
Azad Beg appears to have been killed by the Taleban in 1997.  
9 Walwalji (n.d.), Book 2, Part 2, p. 31. 
10 See Walwalji (n.d.), Book 1 for details. 
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Uzbeks. This was quite obvious in 1992, given the way the organisation came into being. A 
look at the executive Council of Junbesh in 1992 shows how despite being the largest group 
within it, Uzbeks were not the majority. The 14 Uzbeks accounted for 39% of total 
membership in the Council, not too much more than the 30% accounted for by the population 
of the area controlled by Junbesh, that is the six provinces of Faryab, Jowzjan, Sar-i Pul, 
Balkh, Samangan and Baghlan (Table 1). In other words, Uzbeks were somewhat over-
represented, but not overwhelmingly so. This was a reflection of Junbesh being a coalition of 
all northern groups and not of a conscious choice of the leadership, but there is other 
evidence of the absence of any intention of the leadership of moving towards any form of 
ethnic purity, even if Dostum himself and most of his closest advisers were Uzbeks. During 
1992-1993 the leadership of Junbesh was very active in recruiting jihadi commanders to its 
ranks, and these commanders were from all ethnic groups (Table 1). Only 29% of them were 
Uzbek and another 17% were Turkmen. If there was an ethnic aspect in Junbesh’s attitudes, it 
was hostility towards Pashtuns. There was not a single Pashtun sitting in the Executive 
Council, even if Pashtuns represented a significant share of the population of northern 
Afghanistan. On the other hand, Pashtuns commanders were still being recruited. Again this 
lack of Pashtun representation is not surprising, given that the Movement of the North had 
started in response of a perceived attempt to ‘pashtunise’ the higher ranks of the northern 
zone’s military, and that most Pashtuns in positions of responsibility had been associated with 
that attempt.  
 
Table 1: key members of Junbesh by ethnic background 
 
Shura-ye aali seferat-e Shomal 
(Executive Council) 
Jihadi 
commanders 
recruited (92-93) 
Key 
commanders 
(2002)  
1992 2002   
Uzbeks 14 9 20 9
Turkmens 4 1 12 1
Tajiks 8 0 19 3
Hazaras 6 1 2 1
Pashtuns 0 1 6 3
Arabs 3 3 2 1
Hazara-Ismaili 1 0 2 0
Unknown 0 1 6 0
Source: Junbesh-i Milli Islami Afghanistan, ‘Asnaad wa modarak devvomin majmaa aamumy’, Mazar-i Sharif, 
2003; Walwalji (n.d.); Interviews. 
 
 
If we fast forward and look at the composition of the Executive Council in 2002, at the time 
of Junbesh’s second congress, we see a somewhat different picture. Certainly even at this 
date the claim of regional representivity held some truth, as apart from 9 Uzbeks we also find 
Arabs and others, but it is obvious hat much had changed since 1992. Not only did Uzbeks 
now account now for 56% of the Council’s membership, but Tajiks (who had eight members 
in 1992) had altogether disappeared and Turkmens were also no longer strongly represented. 
Hazaras had been reduced to a single member, although this was in part due to the fact that 
Baghlan province, the stronghold of Ismaili Hazaras, was no longer under the control of 
Junbesh. As usual, ethnic representation was more balanced among the commanders. Among 
his top field commanders, nine were Uzbeks, three Pashtuns, three Tajiks, one each Hazara, 
Arab and Turkmen, while one had a mixed Uzbek/Tajik background. In a sense it could be 
argued that Junbesh was moving from being a tool for representing different interests (with a 
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special place for Uzbeks) with little ability to act as a single entity, towards being a more 
effective political organisation, capable of carrying out tasks in a somewhat disciplined and 
coordinated way. In the process it was shedding several of its components and ceased to 
represent their interests, starting instead to transform into an ethnic party. 
 
Within the Junbesh of mid-1992 there were already strong tendencies pushing towards ethnic 
issues. In particular, three of the initial components of Junbesh had an explicitly ethnic 
agenda. The component closest to the core of Junbesh was Guruh-i Kar, a splinter faction of 
the HDKA which had developed a pro-ethnic minorities agenda and recruited mainly Uzbeks. 
Its main stronghold was the province of Faryab. The membership of Guruh-i Kar played an 
important role in the 1992 uprising against President Najibullah and was active thereafter in 
trying to push Junbesh towards a ‘pro-minority’ agenda. Another similar group was SAZA 
(Sazman-e Enqelabi-ye Zahmatkashanha-ye Afghanistan). SAZA had originated from a 1970 
split within the HDKA and was actually bigger than Guruh-i Kar. However, its main areas of 
activity were Badakhshan and Takhar in north-eastern Afghanistan and its presence in the 
five northern provinces was modest. It mainly recruited Tajiks. The third group, Ittehadiya 
Islami-ye Shamal-e Afghanistan, had a completely different origin. It was formed in the early 
1980s in Pakistan by Azad Beg and others, mainly mujahirin from Soviet Central Asia. It had 
a Pan-turkic agend, but in fact it mainly recruited among Turkmen jihadi commanders of 
Faryab, Jowzjan and Balkh provinces. Its following was modest and rather than leftist it was 
composed of conservative Muslim or traditional leaders. These groups supported northern 
regionalism because they saw it as a vehicle for their ethnic agenda, contrary to Junbesh 
which was essentially pragmatic about it. Guruh-i Kar in particular counted three members in 
the Executive Council and SAZA another one, although in terms of organisational 
capabilities their contribution paled compared to that of the remnants of the HDKA.11 During 
the period of the civil wars, these two groups remained associated with Junbesh, especially 
Guruh-i Kar, not least because like the HDKA they were potential targets of extremist 
mujahidin and employment opportunities in the North were not abundant outside Junbesh’s 
structure.  
 
 
A weak ideological drive towards ethnicisation 
However, the main push towards ethnicising Junbesh did not come from these groups, even if 
they did exercise some influence. Indeed, such groups soon turned into an obstacle to the 
consolidation of Junbesh as an ethnic party, for a number of reasons. The increasingly 
disaffected intelligentsia, which belonged to the ethnic left parties, started drifting away from 
Junbesh, complaining that the military commanders were holding on to all the power and 
would not allow the educated elite to have a say in the running of things.12 The leaders of 
these small leftists groups could only see with scorn Dostum’s efforts to establish himself as 
the leading representative of the Turkic people of Afghanistan. The relationship improved 
somewhat under Taleban domination, as the urge to fight the common enemy was 
overwhelming, but even after the fall of the Taleban Dostum and the ethnic left could not 
come together again. Several of the historical leaders of Guruh-i Kar had not come back from 
exile in Central Asia by the end of 2004, a sign of mistrust towards Dostum. In fact some of 
them briefly turned up in northern Afghanistan to explore the possibility of re-establishing an 
                                                
11 Personal communication with Dr. Burna Asefi, London, 2 November 2002. 
12 Personal communication with Eng. Ahmad and Enyatollah Edoyat, Mazar-i Sharif, 8 June 2004. Edoyat also 
wrote his memoirs (unpublished), where he detailed the progressive disenchantment of the intelligentsia with 
Dostum.  
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autonomous party, but quickly abandoned the project and went back to Central Asia. Among 
the followers of Guruh-i Kar who had stayed in Afghanistan, the majority opted to form a 
new party in 2002, led by Eng. Ahmad and Enyatollah Edoyat and called Junbesh-i 
Hambastagi Milli. Hambastagi Milli began to compete for Junbesh’s own constituency, and 
did well during the selection of candidates to the Constitutional Loya Jirga in late 2003, as 
four of its candidates won the race in Faryab and one in Jowzjan. Their main criticism of 
Junbesh was that the leadership was not serious about pushing forward the issue of minority 
rights and was rather busy compromising with opportunistic warlords and negotiating 
positions of power with the central government. From time to time Dostum would flirt with 
the ethnic left, for example when he proposed a merger to the leaders of Junbish-i 
Hambastagi Milli at the end of summer of 2004, who refused the offer.13 A few weeks earlier, 
Eng. Ahmad had been accusing Dostum of preventing his candidacy to the presidential 
elections, by instructing his followers to sabotage his collection of copies of voters’ 
registration cards.14  
 
It was clear to the leaders of the ethnic left that to the extent that the leadership of Junbesh 
was interested in ethnicism, it was not so much because it shared their ideology, but rather 
because it was opportunistically seeking some form of legimisation. It is also likely that 
Junbesh was fearful of Guruh-i Kar becoming one day a powerful competitor for the 
allegiance of the Uzbeks, because of  its relatively strong following in Fayab. The latter point 
is somewhat demonstrated by the greater ease with which Dostum and Junbesh seem to have 
cooperated with the other major ‘ethnic left’ group, SAZA, and maintained a better 
relationship with Junbesh than Guruh-i Kar. SAZA had left Junbesh quite early and from the 
beginning of 2002 was busy reorganising its ranks, but this was not seen as a problem insofar 
as SAZA was appealing to a mainly Tajik constituency, to which Dostum had little appeal 
anyway, and had only a limited following outside its strongholds in the north-east. Only a 
few members of SAZA had switched their allegiance to Dostum and they were not prominent 
ones.15 A further confirmation that Junbesh did not want ethnic ideologists to get too close to 
its core base of support is given by the fact that Junbesh maintained very good relations with 
Latif Pedram, leader of a small party called Kangare-ye Milli, who took part in the 
presidential elections of late 2004 and received 1.4% of the votes. Pedram had long been 
friendly to Dostum, who for a while considered supporting him in the presidential elections, 
until he finally decided to run himself. Given Pedram’s largely Tajik constituency, an alliance 
with Dostum would be relatively trouble-free, as the two men do not compete over the same 
constituency. Moreover, Pedram’s organisational weakness meant that there was little 
potential threat coming from him.16  
 
Junbesh’s resolve to prevent other groups from consolidating ethnic constituencies within 
what it considered its Turkic heartlands is also demonstrated by the Turkmen case. The main 
representatives of the community within Junbesh had originally been Nur Mohammad 
Qarqin, a former Khalqi who was among the founders of Junbesh, and Azad Beg. With Azad 
Beg gone, the following of Ittehadiya was dispersed, but due to the fact that Turkmens are 
maily concentrated in Junbesh’s strongholds of Greater Andkhoy and Jowzjan, Dostum was 
                                                
13 UN source, Mazar-i Sharif, September 2004. 
14 Personal communication with Asadullah Walwalji, Kabul, August 2004. According to electoral law, every 
presidential candidate had to present 10,000 copies of voters’ card in order to be allowed to run. 
15 Personal communications with members of SAZA, Maimana, May 2004; Mazar-i Sharif, August 2004; 
Maimana August 2004. 
16 Personal communication with Vikram Parekh of International Crisis Group, Kabul, July and September 2004; 
personal communication with Mr. Kabul and Akbar Kargar, London, January 2004. 
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able to gain the upper hand and maintain military control over the community. Following the 
fall of the Taleban, weapons began to be replaced by politics, and Dostum made serious 
efforts to befriend the community, supporting the appointment of Qarqin as Minister of 
Social Affairs in Kabul and getting Azad Dodfar, formerly a supporter of Azad Beg, to join 
Junbesh at the Second Congress in 2002. Moreover, Dostum supported Qarqin request that 
Greater Andkhoy be transferred from Faryab province to Jowzjan, thereby consolidating the 
Turkmen majority in the latter province. He also tolerated the appointment of a Turkmen 
governor in Jowzjan, who was not aligned with Junbesh.17 Nonetheless, as the presidential 
elections approached, what had been Dostum’s main pillar of support among the Turkmen 
community, that is the tiny educated elite, turned to a large extent against him. Qarqin 
enlisted as Karzai’s campaign organiser in northern Afghanistan, while Dodfar came out 
publicly in support of Karzai.18 The most frequently stated source of grievance against 
Dostum were the abuses of his commanders against the population, who were particularly 
resented by Turkmens because Uzbek commanders preferred to target them rather than their 
fellow Uzbeks. However, a more likely source of trouble was Dostum’s willingness to be 
seen as a leader of the Turkmens than as an ally, which was unacceptable to ambitious 
individuals like Dodfar and especially Qarqin, who saw himself as the natural leader of the 
Turkmens.19  
 
Dostum’s efforts to secure exclusive control over ethnic constituencies suggest that he and 
his entourage did think ethnically, but mainly in terms of analysing the political environment, 
rather than in terms of enhancing the status of their Uzbek and Turkmen kin, as was the case 
with ethnic parties like Guruh-i Kar, SAZA and Ittehadiya. Junbesh’s main concern was to 
secure these constituencies as an exclusive source of support. As long as military means were 
sufficient to maintain control over the Turkic heartland, an openly ethnicist discourse was not 
needed to mobilise the population. Providing services and rewards was of course a concern, 
but mainly because Junbesh needed to legitimise itself in the eyes of the Uzbek and Turkmen 
population and earn their passive cooperation. The small ethnic parties were not the source of 
Junbesh’s drift towards ethnicism, which was instead a response to a set of changing 
circumstances. 
 
 
Ethnicity a result of conflict, rather than a cause 
The first development which started setting Junbesh on an ethnic course was, as shown 
earlier, the conflict with President Najibullah in late 1991-early 1992 over the appointment of 
Pashtun commanders over the military units stationed in northern Afghanistan. In a sense, 
Junbesh was created with an inbuilt hostility towards Pashtuns, although this should not be 
interpreted too strictly. From the beginning there were quite a few Pashtuns in Junbesh, even 
if they did not occupy positions of political leadership. Most of them were security officers 
coming from other regions of Afghanistan who happened to be in northern Afghanistan at the 
time of the collapse of the Najibullah’s regime and chose to join Junbesh as the lesser evil 
compared to the Islamist parties which dominated the rest of Afghanistan. Far from planning 
an ethnic cleansing, Junbesh started recruiting Pashtun jihadi commanders, who accounted in 
1993 for 9% of total recruits into Junbesh, a percentage below the actual share of Pashtuns 
out of the total population of the region, but still not an insignificant one (see Table 1). Some 
                                                
17 Pesonal communication with Nur M. Qarqin, Kabul, May 2003; personal communication with Roz 
Mohammad Nur, governor of Jowzjan, July 2004. 
18 UN source, Mazar-i Sharif, July 2004. 
19 Personal communication with Nur M. Qarqin, Kabul, May 2003. 
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of them occupied commanding positions, like Juma Khan Hamdard who played an important 
role in the conflicts of the mid-1990s, and Wali Mohammed Khel who commanded the 70th 
Division after the death of General Momin.  The Taleban occupation of northern Afghanistan 
(and the massacres which followed it) renewed and greatly strengthened anti-Pashtun 
sentiment in the region. Dostum’s opportunism does not appear to be have been too shaken 
by the turmoil of 1998-2001, and in 2002 he was again quite generous in appointing Pashtuns 
to lead his militias. Among the leading commanders, Pashtuns then accounted for 17% of the 
total (Table 1). Moreover, during 2003 he developed a relationship with his former enemy, 
Bashir Baghlani, the disgraced former commander of Hizb-i Islami in Baghlan, who was 
Dostum’s guest for a while. Baghlani even toyed with the idea of forcefully re-entering 
Baghlan province with Dostum’s support, before opting to lobby President Karzai and try to 
be re-appointed to a position of responsibility.20 Dostum also apparently tried to recruit 
Pashtuns to his side in Takhar province in 2002-2003.21 Perhaps even more significantly, 
during the summer of 2004 Pashtun representatives attended a meeting meant to choose the 
vice-presidential candidates to stand with Dostum, and tried to push for one of the two vice-
presidents to be Pashtun. While the meeting ended in a stalemate, they succeeded in having 
the whole issue referred to Dostum himself. Finally, the choice fell on a Pashtun woman, 
Shafiqa Habibi, although she was probably not the candidate they had in mind. Pashtuns had 
earlier rarely played such an important role in contributing to Junbesh’s policy choices, and 
significantly the stand of their representatives contributed to prevent the powerful Qataghan 
Uzbeks from imposing their own candidate.22 There does not seem to be evidence, therefore, 
that Dostum personally treated Pashtuns as enemies.  
 
However, his commanders were a different matter. Following the fall of the Taleban regime, 
a massive wave of harassment and revenge attacks hit the Pashtun communities of northern 
Afghanistan over the December 2001-March 2002 period, with as many as 200,000 people 
being forced to flee to Pakistan or southern Afghanistan.23 Dostum, or at least his entourage, 
must have been aware of the political cost of this exodus, both in terms of maintaining 
control over the region in the long term and in terms of maintaining good relations with 
Kabul. Indeed, in 2003 Dostum launched what he probably meant to be a major initiative in 
Mazar-i Sharif, inviting Pashtun notables from all around the region and offering them a 
peace deal. The initiative was welcomed initially,24 but failed to be fully implemented 
because of lack of support among local commanders. Although harassment of Pashtun 
communities markedly decreased between 2002 and 2004, by the end of 2004 the majority of 
the northern Pashtuns still felt rather uneasy about living in territories controlled by 
Junbesh.25 A typical example can be seen in the riots which led to the ejection of Governor 
Enoyat and commander Hashim Habibi from Faryab province in April 2004. Among other 
things, Enoyat was accused of favouring the local Pashtun community in administrative 
appointments. During the riots, however, attacks to Pashtuns were limited to verbal abuse and 
some minor physical aggressions. A crowd of angry Uzbeks marching on a Pashtun village 
near Maimana (the centre of Faryab) was held off by Pashtun villagers holding sticks and 
                                                
20 UN source, December 2003. 
21 Personal communication with Mervyn Patterson, November 2003. 
22 Personal communication with Afghan intellectual, July 2004, Shiberghan. 
23 See Human Rights Watch, On the Precipice: insecurity in northern Afghanistan, New York: Human Rights 
Watch, 2002. 
24 Personal communication with Farouq Azam, London, July 2003. 
25 Based on personal communications with Pashtun intellectuals and notables, northern and north-eastern 
Afghanistan, October 2003-September 2004. 
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stones. No firearms were used, except from the governor’s own guards.26 While these events 
were hardly welcomed by the local Pashtuns, they were still a far cry from the ethnic 
cleansing of 2001-2002, when tens of thousands lost their lives, others were injured or raped 
and tens of thousands had to flee. It appears clear that Dostum was putting some effort in 
bringing order to northern Afghanistan and that he had achieved some success, but it is also 
clear that his achievements were far from being enough to produce any political support for 
Junbesh among Pashtuns, if that was indeed possible at all. Indeed, in the more liberal 
political climate created by the presidential campaign of 2004, whatever support Dostum had 
appeared to have among Pashuns quickly evaporated. Juma Khan Hamdard, who until the 
summer of 2004 had been commander of Junbesh’s 8th Corps, despite having sent his 
representatives to the meeting convened to choose Dostum’s vice-presidential candidates,27 
publicly declared his support for President Karzai.28 Judging from the statements of Pashtun 
notables from the region, few Pashtuns voted for Dostum.29  
 
Unable to attract a large Pashtun constituency because of its own nature, Junbesh also had 
few chances of gathering long-term support from the Hazara community of northern 
Afghanistan, despite the warm support that it received in its early days from the leaders of 
Hizb-i Wahdat, by far the predominant party among the Hazaras. Indeed, of all the jihadi 
parties Hizb-i Wahdat was the one that maintained the best relations with Junbesh throughout 
the existence of the latter and its leaders, especially Mazari, played a key role in the early 
days in pushing Dostum towards shaping Junbesh into a political party.30 On the other hand, 
Mohammad Mohaqqeq, who was to emerge as the foremost Hazara politician in the 2004 
presidential elections, acquired his stature as the leader of Wahdat in northern Afghanistan 
thanks to Dostum’s generous support in 1992-1997. He always maintained good relations 
with Dostum, if not with Junbesh as a whole.  In part because of this, the northern branch of 
Wahdat was strongly influenced by Junbesh, especially with regard to the organisation of its 
militias. 
 
However, there was never any doubt in the mind of Wahdat’s leaders that their agenda was 
different from Junbesh’s. Wahdat did get involved in Junbesh’s internecine conflicts after 
Malik staged his coup against Dostum in 1997. Occasional clashes occurred between Wahdat 
and Junbesh at the local level, while at the national level, relations between Junbesh and 
Wahdat deteriorated somewhat after Mazari’s death. The clerical component of Wahdat 
always looked at Junbesh with suspicion, because of its secular makeup,31 although in 
political terms this secularism quite suited them, at least when compared to the Sunni 
fundamentalism of the jihadi parties. Seen in a long-term perspective, however, these were 
not serious problems, certainly not serious enough to outweigh the fact that no other parties in 
the Afghan civil wars had been as close as Junbesh and Wahdat. The real issue was that the 
attraction of Wahdat’s main body in Hazarajat and Kabul was too strong for Wahdat’s 
northern branch to resist it and be effectively incorporated in Junbesh. Moreover, if any party 
or faction had an ideology-driven ethnic agenda in early 1990s’ Afghanistan, that was 
Wahdat, a fact that translated into a strong identity and a hostility to merging with other 
factions. Those groups of Hazaras who stayed within Junbesh, such as Ali Sarwar’s regiment 
                                                
26 Personal communication with leader of the Pashtun community, Maimana, August 2004; UN source, 
Maimana, August 2004. 
27 Personal communication with Afghan intellectual, July 2004, Shiberghan. 
28 IWPR, Afghan Recovery Report, 14 September 2004. 
29 Personal communications with intellectuals and Pashtun notables, June-September 2004. 
30 Walwalji (n.d.), Book 1, pp.33 ff. 
31 Personal communication with Homayoun Fourkhabi, London, October 2002. 
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in Balkh, had roots in Najibullah’s militias and not from groups associated with Wahdat. The 
success of the latter in attracting the northern Hazaras to its fold prevented Junbesh from 
developing a large constituency there, isolating the party from another key source of support 
in the north.32 
 
In practice, Junbesh never had serious chances of integrating large Pashtun and Hazara 
constituencies in its fold. This was not the case of the Tajiks, who were part of Junbesh’s core 
at the beginning and did not have obvious alternatives. For this reason, the failure to attract 
long-term Tajik support was a much bigger blow to Junbesh. While there might have been 
several reasons for this failure, the most important one is clearly the conflict with Jamiat-i 
Islami.  
 
Junbesh initially counted on a large number of Tajik regular army officers, civilian 
functionaries and personalities, among whom the leading figure was general Momen, 
commander of the 70th Division in Hairatan. On the other hand, in northern Afghanistan 
Jamiat was, in 1992, a mixed Tajik, Uzbek, Arab and Turkmen party, with a few Pashtuns in 
its ranks too. When its leader Ustad Atta (a Tajik himself)separated from Junbesh in 1993, 
however, it was mainly Tajik commanders who followed him. Many of the Uzbek 
commanders, especially in Samangan province, stayed with Dostum. Ahmad Khan, leading 
commander of Jamiat in Samangan, was to become one of Junbesh’s foremost field 
commanders and sworn enemy of Jamiat. It is tempting to see an early manifestation of an 
ethnic split in this development, but in reality local factors were at play. Most jihadi 
commanders of northern Afghanistan were permanently involved in some form of conflict 
with their neighbours. When Atta asked to jihadi commanders to choose sides, those who 
followed him were often involved in feuds with other commanders within Junbesh, who 
happened to be mostly Uzbeks. Uzbeks commanders tended to have stronger links with 
Junbesh’s leadership, not least because they often occupied easily accessible areas around the 
towns, whereas Tajiks were mostly settled in more remote regions. Among the important 
Uzbek commanders aligned with Junbesh who had feuds with Tajik Jamiatis the most 
important ones were: 
 
• the Hizb-i Islami Uzbek group of Nassim Mehdi in Jowzjan, which like most Hizbis 
had been pursuing its own anti-Jamiat agenda throughout northern Afghanistan, 
dictated by an ideological split within the Islamist movement; 
• another Hizb-i Islami group, this time of Pashtuns, around Juma Khan Hamdard, 
which pushed Tajik commanders in the Balkh district into Atta’s arms; 
• in Samangan province, the strong group of Jamiati Uzbeks around Ahmad Khan, 
which was competing with Tajik commanders of Jamiat.33  
 
There were exceptions to this rule. For example in Faryab, a feud had long opposed two 
coalitions of Uzbek commanders, one linked to Harakat-i Enqelab and another to Jamiat. 
Here, because the Harakat coalition was well entrenched in Junbesh already, most Uzbek 
commanders of Jamiat did not side with Dostum, but went for Atta. On the whole, however, 
Atta’s call found a much keener audience among Tajiks, not because Dostum and his circle 
                                                
32 My own estimate of the ethnic breakdown of the five northern provinces (based on a district by district 
analysis) is the following: Uzbeks 33%, Tajiks 24%, Turkmen 14.5%, Pashtuns 13%, Hazaras 10%, Arabs 
3.5%, others 2%. 
33 Walwalji (n.d.), Book 1, pp.33 ff. 
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had any hostility to Tajiks, but because the privileged releationship that they had granted to 
Uzbek commanders had often alienated their local rivals. 
 
To the extent that ethnicity mattered in determining the alignments in northern Afghanistan in 
1993-1994, it was mainly in an indirect way. Recruitment took place at the local level 
through personal networks and the chances were that recruiters and recruited belonged to the 
same ethnic group, although this was not a prerequisite, especially in the early stages of the 
ethnicisation of Junbesh and Jamiat. Local commanders gathered support among their own 
kin and solidarity group, which tended therefore to belong to the same ethnic group. 
Alliances among commanders and links between commanders and party/faction leaders were 
also based on personal networks, thus favouring the formation of relatively homogeneous 
ethnic clusters. By the early 1980s, Jamiat had already become a ‘jihadi party with a special 
place for Tajiks’, and during 1992-1993 Junbesh rapidly established itself as a ‘northern 
Afghan coalition with a special place for Uzbeks’. However, despite their local causes, the 
effect of these realignments was going to be decisive in determining the long-term ethnic 
character of both Junbesh and Jamiat. The growing Uzbek or Tajik majorities within Junbesh 
and Jamiat had a catalysing effect, drawing greater and greater numbers of commanders 
towards their respective ethnic groups. Although this had also happened to the jihadi parties 
in 1980-1992, now Jamiat and Junbesh were directly exposed to the ethnic discourse, which 
had some popularity among the intelligentsia and officers corps, from which the jihadis had 
been isolated until 1992. Even if neither the leadership of Jamiat or that of Junbesh had any 
intention of consciously absorbing ethnic ideologies, among their members ethnic categories 
started being used to rationalise a conflict which had originated in the competition for 
regional leadership between ambitious individuals, as well as a cultural and political split 
along Islamist/leftist lines. By late 1993, following a spate of local clashes, many were 
already starting to believe that an incipient conflict was about to divide Uzbeks and Tajiks. 
As a result, when General Momin died at the beginning of 2004, Dostum was immediately 
accused of having eliminated him, and most of Momin’s closest circle and of the staff of 70th 
Division, who were Tajiks, opted to join Jamiat.34  
 
There is evidence that if the membership of Jamiat and Junbesh increasingly interpreted the 
conflict in ethnic terms, the leaderships of the two parties had not adopted an ethnic agenda. 
As late as 2003 Dostum was still trying to recruit Tajik commanders in key areas, such as 
Baghlan province, where he approached commanders Mustafa and Khalil of Shura-i Nezar.35 
In 2004, Junbesh appointed Tajik commanders to dominating positions in mixed Uzbek/Tajik 
districts such as Bilchiragh and Gurziwan in order to oppose the long-time dominant 
commander in those districts, Uzbek Hashim Habibi, who had broken with Junbesh in early 
2004.36 Similarly, in 2004 the population of Gosfandi district (Sar-i Pul) still did not perceive 
the long-standing local feud between Junbesh and Jamiat as an ethnic matter and the two 
parties had mixed ethnic membership in that district.37 On the Jamiat side, during 2003 a lot 
of effort was spent trying to recruit Uzbeks in Faryab province, and the establishment of a 
new division (24th) had already been authorised in 2002 just for that purpose.38 This trend 
was strengthened by the fact that even if some of the Uzbek commanders involved in pushing 
Tajiks out of Junbesh (like Nassim Mehdi) in the end quit Junbesh themselves, the long years 
of conflict with Jamiat had strengthened anti-Tajik feelings among Junbesh rank-and-file. For 
                                                
34 Walwalji (n.d.), Book 1, pp.33 ff. 
35 Personal communication with former member of a jihadi party, Pul-i Khumri, December 2003. 
36 Interview with UN source, August 2004. 
37 Personal communication with member of Jamiat from Gosfandi, August 2004. 
38 UN sources, June 2004. 
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example, at the time of discussing electoral options in the run up to the presidential elections 
of 2004, some members of Junbesh proposed an alliance with the Tajiks, but other influential 
members, including commander Lal, vetoed the idea.39  
 
A good example of how the early, spontaneous ethnicisation process was motivated by local 
patterns is Takhar province in 2001-2004. Here Uzbek commanders, mostly formerly 
members of Hizb-i Islami, had joined Shura-i Nezar after the Taleban had taken Kabul and 
northern Afghanistan. They were the strongest force in the province and contributed 
decisively to Shura-i Nezar holding out against the Taleban in 1998-2001. However, the 
patronage-based politics of Jamiat/Shura-i Nezar led to appointments at the top of the 
military structure of the organisation which were very heavily biased towards the Tajiks. By 
the summer of 2001 the Uzbek commanders of Takhar had grown tired of playing the role of 
Massud’s cannon fodder, as one of them put it, without being rewarded with status 
appointments. They agreed then to form a ‘lobby’ group, called the Qataghan Shura, meant to 
help their cause by collectively bargaining for a better deal within Shura-i Nezar.40 However, 
Jamiat’s politics were so deeply constrained by patronage committiments to an ever 
expanding clientele, that little was left for the Uzbeks of Takhar even after the establishment 
of the first post-Taleban government. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the local Uzbeks 
started looking around for alternatives and developing an ethnic explanation of their 
grievances. Earlier attempts by Dostum to recruit in Takhar had had little success and had 
been limited to a few former militia commanders of the Najibullah regime, who joined him in 
1992-1993.41 Due to logistical and geographical constraints, Dostum did not have the 
opportunity to insist in his efforts throughout the 1994-2000 period, but he resumed his 
approaches in 2001, when he was allowed to send his representatives to the region within the 
framework of the United Front, the anti-Taleban alliance with Jamiat. The contacts with the 
local Uzbek commanders continued to develop under the surface. During 2002 a ‘Peace 
Shura of the North Eastern Zone’ operated in Takhar province, under the leadership of 
Mahmoor Hassan, a former commander of Hizb-i Islami who would later become Junbesh’s 
leader in the region. The Shura was widely rumoured to be supported by Dostum, but its open 
campaigning was focused on the monopolisation of local power structures by Tajik 
commanders belonging to Jamiat. Interestingly, at the June 2002 Congress four places were 
left vacant in the Executive Council, to be occupied by Junbesh’s representatives from the 
north-eastern provinces, presumably Uzbeks. No seats were left reserved for representatives 
from other regions of Afghanistan, even if Junbesh claimed to be expanding its structure 
there too. This went on until at the end of the summer of 2003, when the majority of the 
Uzbek commanders of Takhar openly switched sides and joined Junbesh. After that these 
commanders acted as a catalyst, and throughout the rest of 2003 and 2004 more commanders 
joined Junbesh in Takhar. By the end of 2004, the only significant alternative Uzbek-based 
force in Takhar was Qazi Qabir with his Shura-i Adolat, who had succeeded, by virtue of his 
ruthlessness, in creating his own pole of attraction in the northern districts of Yangi Qala and 
Darqad. An important aspect of this shift is that it was not just commanders who switched 
sides. The population of Takhar had earlier been considered to be pro-Karzai, but in the 2004 
presidential elections it offered considerable support to Dostum.42  
 
 
                                                
39 Personal communication with Afghan intellectual, July 2004, Shiberghan. 
40 Personal communication with Mervyn Patterson, November 2003. 
41 Walwalji (n.d.) p.166, Book 2, Part 2, p.34. 
42 Personal communication with Mervyn Patterson, November 2003. 
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Seeking legitimacy among the electorate: Junbesh after the fall of the Taleban 
Until 2001, Junbesh had been working as a transmission belt between the leadership and the 
local structures of power, and if its incorporation of various (ethnic and non-ethnic) lobbies 
cannot be said to have worked extremely well, at least it did not prevent Junbesh from 
functioning. After 2001, the Afghan political landscape changed dramatically. Two Loya 
Jirgah were planned to be selected by ‘grand electors’, one in 2002 and another in 2003, 
while universal suffrage elections were scheduled to follow. In other words, the purpose of 
existence of Junbesh was changing.  It was going to need to appeal to ‘masses’ of small 
communities and individual voters. The shift towards electoral and political campaigning 
accelerated the process of ethnic consolidation of the factions. Faced with masses of potential 
voters, it became more difficlt to argue for a ‘special place’ for Uzbeks within a northern 
regional movement. Prospective and aspiring politicians, targeting the urban population as 
the most responsive to political propaganda, were unwilling to alienate large chunks of their 
potential electorate by allying with factions seen as hostile to a particular ethnic group. Fayz 
Mehr Roeen, for example, formely a leading Ismaili Tajik member of Junbesh, was offered 
by Dostum one of the vice-presidential posts, but despite having endorsed Dostum’s 
candidacy just a few weeks earlier, he declined the offer and opted instead to run as the 
deputy of Mohaqqeq.43 
 
Junbesh did make an effort to re-launch the idea of northern regionalism in the period up to 
the Constitutional Loya Jirga (end of 2003), and put the idea of a federal state at the forefront 
of its project. Federalism appeared well suited as a vehicle to ensure a solid power base to 
Junbesh after the disarmament of the militias and was also probably meant as a tool to attract 
consensus throughout the ethnic spectrum of northern Afghanistan. However, the concept of 
northern Afghanistan as a political entity had worn out during the years of the civil war and 
was no longer suited to strengthen Junbesh’s appeal. In a number of cases, inter-ethnic 
conflict within the region was the paramount concern of local communities, rather than 
relations with Kabul. Furthermore, national elections offered an opportunity to gather support 
well beyond Junbesh’s area of military control, that is beyond northern Afghanistan. Finding 
an effective glue to hold together a movement mainly created on the basis of Dostum’s 
military charisma, and at the same time appealing to the electorate, became an obvious 
problem for Junbesh. Leftist ideas were discredited and brandishing them would have been 
counterproductive, not least within Junbesh itself, given the presence of many former 
mujahidin in its ranks. Equal rights for women worked well to win some support abroad, but 
generated little interest within Afghanistan, outside restricted circles of educated women and 
those women who had been mobilised by the HDKA during the 1980s. Secularism was 
genuinely appreciated by the intelligentsia and some urban strata, but proved insufficient to 
build a viable party and compete successfully in elections. Even if the ‘northern region’ 
rhetoric was never completly abandoned and public statements about the Turkic character of 
Junbesh were never issued, the opportunism of the leadership was pushing Junbesh towards 
playing the card of ethnic nationalism, attempting to mobilise Turkic feelings among the 
population. During the 1990s the ‘special place’ attributed to the Uzbeks had produced some 
examples of seeking legitimisation on an ethnic basis, such as changing the name of streets or 
the strengthening of the teaching of Uzbek and Turkmen in the schools, at the expense of 
Pashto.44 During 2002-2004, however, it became common practice for the national and local 
leaders of Junbesh to present themselves in public and private discussions as defenders of the 
                                                
43 Personal communication with Fayz Mehr Roeen, Mazar-i Sharif, August 2004.  
44 G. Dorronsoro, La Révolution Afghane, Karthala, 2000, p.289. 
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rights of the Uzbeks and Turkmen of Afghanistan.45 The campaign escalated after the 
Constitutional Loya Jirgah at the end of 2003 and the old regionalist rhetoric appeared to 
have been forgotten, replaced by a more realistic attempt to build alliances with other 
ethnically based groups. While the demand for a federal system failed to achieve a 
widespread appeal, the demand made by Junbesh that Uzbek be given the status of official 
language on a par with Pashto and Dari had quite a widespread resonance and subsequently 
became one of the main points of Junbesh’s campaigning.  
 
Ethnic mobilisation proved quite successful, even if the ethnic pluralism of northern 
Afghanistan forced Junbesh to be cautious on this issue. The rising credibility of Dostum’s 
claim to be a leader of Afghan Uzbeks could be seen already a few months into the post-
Taleban era, when he received the endorsement of one of Uzbekistan’s opposition parties, 
Birlik, which in July 2002 published a favourable report on its web site,46 not to mention the 
enthusiasm that Dostum could arouse in some Turkish politicians.47 Even outside educated 
circles, although there was little sense of Uzbek ethnicity in Afghanistan before the war, 
during the 1990s there were signs that this might be changing. For example, the term qawn, 
originally meant to indicate one’s own tribe or subtribe, by the beginning of the 21st century 
was increasingly being used to indicate all Afghan Uzbeks. Membership in a particular tribe 
or subtribe appeared to be losing importance.48 While this trend had much deeper causes than 
Junbesh’s propaganda, it is likely that it was also contributing to it by 2002. Among other 
things, a television company, AINA TV, was established in Mazar-i Sharif to voice Junbesh’s 
views, and in early 2005 its coverage was expanded to the northeast.49 Despite the lingering 
suspicion with which he is looked at among the most conservative Uzbek communities,50 
Dostum had some success in positioning himself as a ‘useful’, if not loved, representative of 
Uzbek interests in Afghanistan. Even in a relatively isolated district like Burka (Baghlan 
province), by 2004 the largely Uzbek population was exercising pressure on the local 
commanders, still aligned with Jamiat, to start supporting Dostum and Junbesh.51 To a large 
extent this was achieved through his own persona, him being the only Uzbek known 
throughout Afghanistan, although not always for good reasons, and the only one known to 
have power. Dostum’s case proves that no publicity is bad publicity. 
 
The impact of Dostum’s persona was supplemented by a number of other initiatives. Once it 
appeared clear that federalism would not have been part of the new constitution, Junbesh 
started an orderly withdrawal and focused its propaganda on other issues, such as the creation 
of larger provinces, encompassing whole regions and the election of the governors, which 
would allow the minorities (and of course Junbesh itself) to build a power base within the 
state structures. For example, this is the case of the consolidation of the majority of Turkmens 
in a single province through the transfer of Greater Andkhoy to Jowzjan, which was claimed 
to make it easier to distribute education and other ethnically targeted services to Turkmens 
and at the same time increase their political leverage vis-à-vis the centre. Education was 
clearly the cornerstone of ethnic politics in Junbesh’s post-war politics. Among the Uzbek 
                                                
45 See, for example, Junbesh (paper published Mazar-e Sharif) of 13 December 2003. 
46 BBC Monitoring, 13 July 2002. 
47 Communication with Dr. Umit Cizre, Geneva, July 2004. 
48 Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek, ‘Ethnic identity versus Nationalism: the Uzbeks of north-eastern Afghanistan and 
the Afghan state’, in Touraj Atabaki & John O'Kane (eds), Post-Soviet Central Asia, I B Tauris & Co Ltd, 1998, 
pp.221-222. 
49 AINA TV, 6 February 2005. AINA also announced its intention to start covering eastern Afghanistan 
(Nangarhar) as well, a region inhabited by Pashtuns. 
50 Personal communication of Prof. Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek, August 2003. 
51 UN source, April 2004. 
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intelligentsia the idea was being circulated of adopting Turkish as a common language of the 
Turkic minorities in Afghanistan and some members of Junbesh were supporting this view. In 
the short term, however, Junbesh was proposing to teach Turkmen or Uzbek until the third 
year of primary school and start teaching Dari and Pashto afterwards.52 More in general 
Junbesh was trying to convey the idea than only politicians belonging to their own kin could 
be trusted by the Turkic population to deliver goods and services.  
 
 
Conclusion: opportunistic ethnicism and the transition towards a new political order 
Looking at the outcome of the presidential elections of October 2004, when Dostum obtained 
10% of the votes, it could be argued that his efforts to be seen as a candidate of the Turkic 
minority had been successful. Since Uzbeks and Turkmens account for about 9-10% of 
Afghanistan population, it appears obvious that Dostum gathered sweeping majorities among 
them. A province-by-province analysis of the vote confirms this. His success came despite 
the hostility of a large part of the northern intelligentsia, including some key Uzbek, Turkmen 
and Arab figures. He had been quite successful in 2002-2003 at wooing a number of 
relatively high profile individuals, mainly intellectuals living abroad like Dr. Azam Dodfar, 
Dr. Mohammed Akbar, Enyatullah Shahrani and others towards Junbesh. He also attracted 
some jihadi politicians to his side, most notably Nehmatullah Shahrani, a former associate of 
Rasul Sayyaf. However, by the end of 2004 both Dodfar and Nehmatullah Shahrani had 
already broken their relationship with Dostum. This was in line with a trend which had 
already emerged in the mid-1990s, when a number of well-known Uzbek, Turkmen and Arab 
intellectuals, who had in the past supported Junbesh or maintained a relatively close 
relationship with it, like Ismail Akbar, Hedayatullah Hedayat or Asadullah Walwalji, 
increasingly distanced themselves from him and started to criticise him openly. In the context 
of Afghanistan in the early 21st century, Dostum’s failure to keep the northern intelligentsia 
on his side still mattered little, but the potential impact of this shortcoming were potentially 
very damaging for the longer-term legitimisation of Dostum and Junbesh as standard-bearers 
of Turkic minority rights in Afghanistan. 
 
The outcome of the elections was particularly surprising in the case of the Turkmens, as by 
the autumn of 2004 the (actually quite tiny) Turkmen intelligentsia appeared to be mainly 
bent on supporting Karzai or some other candidate, but not Dostum. Of the 20 or so leading 
intellectual figures among the Turkmen, only two, Ismail Munshi and Wazir Mohammad, are 
known to have either campaigned for or supported Dostum.53 The idea that Dostum 
deliberately eliminated any possible strong leader within the community, in order to prevent 
the rising of a rival leadership which could separate the Turkmen community from Junbesh, 
is quite widespread among educated Turkmens. Dostum’s success is likely to have been due 
to the modest influence of the ‘educated’ in Turkmen society. Of all the Afghan ethnic 
groups, Turkmens are definitely among those farthest from political activity and are still 
heavily influenced by local notables. By targeting the traditional notables, Dostum played a 
winning card, not least because despite state support the pro-Karzai elements had proved 
unable to deliver much to the Turkmen communities in terms of patronage or help. Qarqin, 
who had earlier been very influential among Turkmens, by late 2004 had lost much of his 
influence despite having been a cabinet minister in Kabul for quite a while. Even in his home 
district the population was divided between supporters and opponents of Qarqin. It could 
therefore be argued that Dostum succeeded in gathering the Turkmen vote because no serious 
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53 UN source, August 2004; personal communication with Turkmen intellectual, Shiberghan, July 2004. 
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(that is organised) contender emerged from within the community itself, contrary to what 
happened, for example, in the case of the Tajiks and Hazaras. The formation of a Turkmen 
Council, which in the intentions of at least some of its promoters was clearly meant to 
produce such an alternative to Junbesh, by the end of 2004 had not taken off yet, both 
because of organisational difficulties (the Council never moved out of Kabul) and because of 
the limited influence of its members, most of them being former leftists intellectuals enjoying 
little following among the village notables and unable to dispense much patronage.54 
 
Dostum proved to be a successful political entrepreneur in October 2004, and it could be 
argued that if Turkic ethnicity finally conquered a position on the Afghan political scene, it 
was definitely due to Dostum’s role in seizing the moment and adopting ethnicism as one of 
his key campaign platforms. However, his inability to keep the Turkic intelligentsia on his 
side might mean that his long-term legitimisation as the representative of the Uzbeks and 
Turkmens of Afghanistan might be impossible to achieve. Even if Dostum and Junbesh do 
not continue to lead for long the process of re-shaping of Afghanistan’s political order that 
they helped initiate, they will still leave behind a significant legacy. If in the 1970s no 
political group had even 100 members in northern and north-eastern Afghanistan,55 Junbesh 
was mobilising several thousand in 2004. Northern Afghanistan was not going to be the same 
again. 
                                                
54 Personal communication with Turkmen intellectual, Shiberghan, July 2004. 
55 Kh. Khashimbekov (1994), p.32. 
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Figure 1: Map of northern Afghanistan.  
Source: CIA 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Ethnic map of Northern Aghanistan  
Source: Le Fait Ethnique en Iran et en Afghanistan, Editions du CNRS, Paris, 1988, p. 5. 
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Glossary 
Guruh-i Kar: left-wing ethnic nationalist group, which split from HDKA in the 1970s. 
Harakat-e Enqelab-e Islami:  one of the Sunni jihadi parties, which fought in the war against 
the Soviet army. 
 
Harakat-Islami: one of the Shiite parties which fought in the war against the Soviet army. 
 
Hizb-i Demokratik-i Khalq (HDKA): People’s Democratic Party, a Marxist party which ruled 
Afghanistan in 1978-1992.  
 
Hizb-i Islami: Islami Party, a radical Islamist party with a story of hostility towards Jamiat-i 
Islami.  
 
Hizb-i Wahdat: Unity Party, a ethnic-based party led by Hazara clergymen.  
 
Ittehadiya Islami-ye Wilayat-e Shamal: a Turkic nationalist party formed in the early 1980s 
to fight against the Soviet army 
 
Jamiat-i Islami: Islamic Society, a moderate Islamist party which played a key role in the 
war.  
 
Junbesh-i Milli: National Movement, a secularist party based in northern Afghanistan.  
 
Junbesh-i Hambastagi Milli: party formed by the majority of Guruh-i Kar in 2002, led by 
Eng. Ahmad and Enyatollah Edoyat 
 
Kangare-ye Milli: ethnic nationalist party formed in 2003 by Latif Pedram 
 
Loya Jirga: tribal gathering, assembly.  
 
SAZA (Sazman-e Enqelabi-ye Zahmatkashanha-ye Afghanistan): left-wing ethnic nationalist 
party, formed in the 1970s 
 
Shura-i Nezar: Supervisory Council, a faction within Jamiat-i Islami, originally created by 
commander Massud.  
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